Consent of the Governed: Iran Country Study

Summary

The territory of Iran, previously known as Persia, was ruled by monarchical dynasties or occupied and dominated by foreign powers for nearly all of its recorded history. There were only brief periods of a limited parliamentary democracy in the 20th century. In 1979, a revolution against the repressive regime of Shah Pahlavi, the reigning monarch, resulted in establishment of a theocratic dictatorship. The Islamic Republic of Iran has an elected president and legislature, but ultimate control of the government — and who may contest in elections — rests in a Supreme Leader selected by a council of clerics, currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

While elections are not free, Iranians have used them repeatedly as a form of protest to vote for more reform-minded candidates in both presidential and legislative contests. Pro-democracy and pro-freedom movements emerged out of elections in the late 1990s and 2009 but were suppressed by force (see Consent of the Governed below). In recent years, the Supreme Leader re-asserted control over elections to ensure selection of regime loyalists. The sudden death of President Ebrahim Raissi, a longstanding hardline ally of Supreme Leader Khamenei in a plane crash in June 2024, required a special election in July. Iranian voters largely boycotted the first round but ensured the victory of a publicly less hardline candidate in the run-off. (see Current Issues).

In the fall of 2022, another nationwide protest movement arose in response to the killing of a young woman for “improperly wearing” the hijab, or head covering. The protests, under the banner “Woman, Life, Freedom,” were ongoing for more than a year despite government repression, including use of force, widespread arrests, torture and public executions.

In the fall of 2022, another nationwide protest movement arose in response to the killing of a young woman for “improperly wearing” the hijab, or head covering. The protests, under the banner “Woman, Life, Freedom,” were ongoing for more than a year despite government repression, including use of force, widespread arrests, torture and public executions. Manifestations of the movement continued throughout 2024 (see Current Issues).

Iran is the 17th-largest country in the world by area and 17th largest by population (approximately 90 million people in 2023 according to the United Nations). It borders seven countries (Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and Turkmenistan) and three bodies of water (the Caspian Sea to the north and the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman to the south). Iran possesses the world's fourth-largest oil reserves, but its economy has been depressed both by domestic policies and by international and US sanctions. Living standards have declined precipitously. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Iran ranked 34th in the world in projected nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 2024 (at $464 billion), but this figure is likely exaggerated by official exchange rates. Iran ranked much worse in projected nominal per capita GDP (113th, at $5,310 a year for 2024).

History

Cyrus the Great

The Iranian state dates back to Cyrus II, who united several kingdoms into the Persian Empire in 550 BCE. Known as Cyrus the Great, he also conquered most of the Middle East and Asia Minor to form the world’s first extended empire. Uniquely for that time, Cyrus instituted a policy of religious tolerance, which included ordering the return of Jews held in captivity in Babylon. He issued the Cylinder of Cyrus, which lists allowances and freedoms that Cyrus granted to nations under his rule. To show the Cylinder’s historical importance as the earliest known example of tolerance of local religions and customs, the United Nations displays a replica inscribed on its headquarters building in New York City.

From Alexander to the Qajars

Cyrus's Achaemenid dynasty fell to Alexander the Great in 330 BCE. After Alexander's death, one of his generals founded the Seleucid dynasty, which controlled much of present-day Iran. Seleucid rule was followed by two long-lasting Persian dynasties, the Parthian (247 BCE–224 CE) and the Sassanid (224–642 CE). Muslim Arabs invaded in 636 CE and largely subdued Persia by 650 CE, converting it to Islam. Thereafter, the country was ruled by a series of Arab and Turkic dynasties, until being conquered in the 13th century by the Mongol leader Genghis Khan, whose dominion stretched from China. After more than two centuries of Mongol and Turkic rule, the Safavid dynasty was established in northwestern Iran in 1502. It declared Shi’a Islam as the official religion and Iran today remains predominantly Shi’ite. The Safavid dynasty fell in the early 19th century, succeeded in time by the Qajar dynasty.

The Constitutional Revolution

The country’s history of empires and dynasties was interrupted at the beginning of the 20th century by the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–06. It established Iran's first elected parliament and a constitutional monarchy. The Qajar shahs, however, resisted parliamentary government and drew on Russian and British influence to limit constitutional rule. The 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement delineated respective spheres of control in Iran’s south and north to Britain and Russia, with a "neutral" area in the center. In the south, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was established to extract energy resources near the Persian Gulf. The efforts of Constitutionalists to defend the parliament’s powers were hampered by World War I, which saw increased Russian and British military presence. Iran’s parliament again asserted its powers after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, when Russia’s imperial influence weakened, and also successfully rejected Britain’s attempts to gain greater control over the country.

Restoration of the Shahs and Their Final Fall

A young army officer named Reza Khan organized a coup in 1921. Four years later, he had the parliament officially depose the now largely powerless Qajar dynasty and declare him the new monarch under the name Reza Shah Pahlavi. Over the following years, he introduced a number of reforms in an effort to modernize Iran, while at the same time maintaining a heavy repressive hand to stifle internal dissent. The Shah’s refusal to help the Allies in World War II led Great Britain and the Soviet Union to invade the country, now formally renamed Iran, in 1941. The occupiers forced Reza to abdicate in favor of his son, Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi.

Under pressure from the United States, which sought to reduce both British and Soviet presence, allied troops withdrew from the country by 1946. Parliament again reasserted its powers. Then, in 1951, the parliament voted to nationalize the oil industry, which would have ended the British role in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. A nationalist proponent of the plan, Muhammad Mossadegh, became prime minister despite opposition of the shah, who went into temporary exile.

In 1953, monarchists and military officers, with direct support from the United States and Britain, returned the shah from exile to oust Mossadegh. The shah re-established full control over the state and signed an agreement for a joint British, Dutch, French, and US oil consortium to develop Iran's reserves.

Under Shah Pahlavi’s rule, Iran began a second period of modernization, which included land reform and improving women’s rights. Measures to open the country, however, were accompanied by a system of increasing political repression and torture carried out by the notorious SAVAK secret police forces. Repression and growing economic inequality created resentment within the population and ultimately led to a popular revolution in early 1979 and the creation of the Islamic Republic, which is described in the section below.

Consent of the Governed

For most of its history, Iran was governed by either foreign empires or hereditary dynasties exercising absolute control, with only brief periods of a constitutional monarchy and, following World War II, a form of parliamentary democracy. The restoration of Shah Reza Pahlavi to power in 1953 by monarchist and military forces brought a period of modernization, including the promotion of women’s rights, but it also introduced a regime of harsh repression as well as growing economic inequality. Joint secular and religious opposition to the Shah’s rule grew. A series of large protests and general strikes caused Shah Pahlavi to flee the country in January 1979. A secular caretaker regime took the reins of government.

An authoritarian theocracy, a state ruled by religious leaders, replaced the Shah’s secular authoritarian regime. The theocracy effectively precluded consent of the governed.

In early February, the main religious opponent to the Shah, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, returned from exile in Paris and was greeted by a cheering crowd of two to three million people. He quickly put in place an interim government that supplanted the more secular caretaker regime and called for a quick plebiscite to establish an Islamic Republic. There was no process for deliberative discussion, nor democratic procedures to ensure a fair plebiscite. In this way, an authoritarian theocracy, a state ruled by religious leaders, replaced the Shah’s secular authoritarian regime. The theocracy effectively precluded consent of the governed.

The Islamic Republic

The plebiscite approved an interim constitution based on the principle of velayat-e faqih (guardianship by the Islamic jurist). Ayatollah Khomeini assumed the title of Supreme Leader and cemented theocratic rule through amendments to the constitution that until now have prevented changing the form of government. Formally, there is a division of government into executive, legislative and judicial branches, with general elections for president and a parliament (called the Islamic Consultative Assembly or Majlis) that are staggered every four years. All branches of government, however, are overseen by the Supreme Leader, a high cleric selected by an Assembly of Experts (who are all high clerics). The Supreme Leader, currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, holds ultimate power.

The Supreme Leader

The constitution’s establishment of theocracy is complete. For one, the Supreme Leader is granted the power to appoint the heads of the key levers of power: the military, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the chief of the judiciary, and the head of state television and radio. The Supreme Leader also controls the appointment of the Guardian Council, which is tasked with vetting all political candidates for elective office and reviewing legislation passed by the parliament for conformity with Islamic principles. In 1988, Ayatollah Khomeini, created another body, the Council of Expediency, fully appointed by the Supreme Leader, with power to resolve disputes between the parliament and the Guardian Council. In this way, while the constitution establishes some formal separation of constitutional responsibilities for running the government, the Supreme Leader has supreme supervisory powers over all parts of government.

While the constitution establishes some formal separation of constitutional responsibilities for running the government, the Supreme Leader has supreme supervisory powers over all parts of government.

On his return to Iran in 1979, Khomeini immediately forced out the initial secular prime minister. As Supreme Leader, he encouraged a deep paranoia of Western, but particularly United States, influence due to the U.S.’s prior support of the Shah and an Islamist messianism viewing the U.S. as “satanic” for its secular democratic politics. In November 1979, he directed the takeover of the US embassy and the taking of 53 American diplomats and citizens hostage. (They were held for 444 days until their release on January 20, 1981.) As Supreme Leader, he also quickly imposed a strict set of Islamic laws that banned informal contact between unrelated men and women, forced women to cover their heads and bodies in public, among other restrictions.

The Supreme Leader is chosen by the Assembly of Experts. This is a body of senior clerics supposedly elected by popular vote in staggered terms of eight years. In practice, there is no real choice since all candidates for the Assembly are vetted by the Guardian Council, itself appointed by the Supreme Leader. (In 2015, even Khomeini’s grandson, an imam with more moderate views, was blocked from running for the Assembly of Experts.)

Upon Khomeini's death in 1989, the Assembly chose Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, a close Khomeini ally who served as president from 1981 to 1989, as Supreme Leader. While the Assembly of Experts has the responsibility to review Khamenei’s actions in office and retains the formal power to recall him if he violates the constitution, the Supreme Leader’s overall powers to control the membership of both the Guardian Council (and thus the Assembly of Experts), negates any formal power to change leaders.

A Reform Movement Is Thwarted

Despite the regime’s stifling control, Iranian society has organized various forms of resistance.

Despite the regime’s stifling control, Iranian society has organized various forms of resistance. In the mid-1990s, a reformist movement arose around student protests that propelled the election of Mohammad Khatami, also an Ayatollah, as president in 1997. Although vetted by the Guardian Council, he campaigned as a moderate against harder-line backers of theocratic rule. Using their limited powers, Khatami and allies in parliament took small steps to liberalize the media, allow use of the internet, liberalize the economy, and even ease enforcement of Islamic social controls. Reformist parties supporting Khatami won large majorities in 1999 municipal elections and 2000 Majlis elections. In 2001, Khatami won re-election as president with nearly 80 percent of the vote.

The regime’s theocratic institutions re-asserted their power at the direction of Ayatollah Khamenei. The Supreme Religious Council and the Expediency Council vetoed most legislation and counteracted reforms through decrees. For the 2004 parliamentary elections, the Guardian Council struck 2,000 reformist candidates from the electoral list for violating “principles of sovereignty and national unity” or “questioning the Islamic basis of the Republic.” After regaining control over the Majlis, the theocratic leadership then orchestrated the election of a hardline supporter, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as president in 2005.

The Ministry of Security, directly responsible to the Supreme Leader, carried out increasingly repressive policies, ordering the closure of reformist media, non-governmental organizations, and political parties. Independent trade union leaders were imprisoned after organizing strikes against the government’s economic and wage policies.

At the same time, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the most important instrument for consolidating the revolutionary regime in 1979–81, resumed its role as the regime’s enforcer. It aggressively sought out violators of Islamic proscriptions and national security laws. Anyone arrested by the IRGC is tried before its revolutionary tribunals, not the civil courts, with no rights to due process.

Civil society and cultural and human rights activists continued to organize, symbolized by the efforts of human rights lawyer Shirin Ebadi. Her non-violent advocacy for women’s and human rights earned her the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize (see link to her Nobel Lecture in Resources). But in the face of death threats she went into exile in 2009 and currently lives in London.

A Second Revolution Is Crushed

Ahmadinejad promised to redistribute oil revenues to the poor through subsidies and reduced-rate loans, but these pledges went unfilled. His focus as president was on fostering Iran’s nuclear weapons program, hardening a confrontational policy towards the West, and calling for the destruction of Israel. Iran refused cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor its nuclear program. In 2006, following a report by the IAEA detailing Iran’s likely development of nuclear weapons, the United Nations initiated sanctions that increased in severity over the next years.

In the 2009 presidential elections, the Guardian Council approved three candidates to challenge Ahmadinejad, who was still favored by the theocratic leadership. Mir Hossein Mousavi, a former prime minister, campaigned as a reformer and emerged as a serious contender. He gained wide public support. But immediately after polls closed, the government-controlled media announced Ahmadinejad as the winner by a wide margin.

The regime’s blatant manipulation of results prompted huge protests involving hundreds of thousands of people demanding democratic change. The protest movement, called the “Twitter Revolution” and the Green Movement (green was the color adopted by Mousavi’s campaign), eventually dissipated after many months in the face of pervasive police repression and use of force against protests. (At least 72 people were killed.) Mousavi, his wife (herself a prominent intellectual), and Mehdi Karroubi, a fellow reformist candidate who threw his support to Mousavi, were placed under house arrest, where they remain to this day.

Repression, Nuclear Diplomacy and “Reform”

In response to the 2009 protests, Green Movement leaders and hundreds of activists were imprisoned. Non-governmental organizations were closed. Students were expelled from universities.

In response to the 2009 protests, Green Movement leaders and hundreds of activists were imprisoned. Non-governmental organizations were closed. Students were expelled from universities. In addition to holding hundreds of political prisoners, the government repressed thousands of people on charges of committing religious crimes such as moharebeh (“enmity against God”). Revolutionary Tribunals sentenced people to harsh prison terms, severe floggings (up to 100 lashes), and, in a number of cases, execution, usually by public hangings.

In 2013, Hassan Rouhani, considered close to the Supreme Leader, won 51 percent of the vote against seven candidates in the presidential election. Rouhani pledged modest reforms and signaled a willingness to negotiate over Iran’s nuclear program, a change in policy resulting from the economic impact of heightened international sanctions. Rouhani’s public position mirrored behind-the-scenes discussions between United States and Iranian representatives aimed at initiating UN-approved talks over the program.

After two years of negotiation, a final Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed between Iran and the so-called P5+1 group, a UN-authorized body of major powers, in July 2015. The agreement called for Iran to transfer enriched nuclear material out of the country, mothball most centrifuges capable of enriching uranium and plutonium, incapacitate its plutonium reactor, and allow inspections of nuclear facilities (although with notification). The terms were set for a period of fifteen years. In exchange, international sanctions were lifted, including release of frozen assets estimated at $100 billion. Influential members of the US Congress and two key US allies in the region, Israel and Saudi Arabia, opposed the JCPOA for fear that Iran would not actually abandon its nuclear weapons program and was simply trying to gain economic relief from sanctions. The IAEA, however, confirmed that Iran carried out the terms of the deal by early January 2016. This finding triggered the process to end international sanctions.

The regime did not otherwise change its foreign and military policies. Iran continued to develop medium range ballistic missiles, aided the Assad regime in Syria and the Houthi rebellion in Yemen, attacked US forces in Iraq, and provided military support to terrorist groups who used the arms to attack Israel, like Hezbollah and Hamas.

In 2018, President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the JCPOA and placed Iran again under severe sanctions with the stated aim of forcing Iran to lengthen terms of the agreement and alter its aggressive foreign policy. In early 2020, the United States also carried out the assassination of Revolutionary Guards leader General Soleimani, who had directed numerous terrorist attacks at US armed forces. Other foreign parties did not withdraw from the agreement. Iran refused negotiations with the Trump administration and stated that it would renew uranium and plutonium enrichment (see Current Issues below).

Internally, Rouhani took several modest initiatives to liberalize the economy and social life compared to the previous administration. These included easing some media and internet restrictions, releasing some political prisoners and urging the restoration of students expelled from the university. However, over Rouhani’s eight-year administration (he was re-elected in 2017), Rouhani’s initiatives were weaker steps than those taken in the late 1990s and early 2000s. There remained a high level of repression as the Revolutionary Tribunals and Guidance Patrol (known as the “Morality Police”) continued to repress Iranian society for any opposition activity and minor religious infractions. These ranged from posting dance videos on social media to failing to wear the hijab. Repression only increased after Rouhani’s departure.

Current Issues

Following the presidency of Hassan Rouhani (2014-21), who had presided over a modest loosening of restrictions as well as nuclear negotiations (see above), the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, tightened his political control over Iran. For one, he directed the Guardian Council to restrict competition in 2020 parliamentary elections and the 2021 presidential election. As a result, strict loyalists of the theocracy, called “Principlists” or “Conservatives,” gained most of the seats in the 290-seat Islamic Consultative Assembly, or Majlis. Candidates from parties known to be part of a “Reformist” alliance (but who do not oppose the regime and often describe themselves as “conservative”) were limited in number and gained only 45 seats.

Ebrahim Raisi, a longstanding hardline ally of Khamenei and head of the judiciary since 2018, was the main approved candidate for president. (He was notorious for his role in a revolutionary tribunal that sentenced thousands of political prisoners to death in 1988.) Raisi was elected president in July 2021 by a claimed vote of 62 percent, but with record low turnout of 48 percent. (In 2017, Raisi lost to Rouhani by 57 to 35 percent with 73 percent turnout.) As president, Raisi heightened repression in response to domestic unrest (see below), pursued an even more aggressive anti-Western foreign policy and increased the control of hardline “principlists” within the regime.

Notwithstanding Iran’s hardening domestic politics and aggressive foreign policies, Ayatollah Khamenei allowed a restart of negotiations with the United States and the P5+1 group initiated by a new US president, Joseph R. Biden, following his inauguration in January 2021. After two years of negotiations, however, the Iranian government did not agree to either US or European-member proposals for restoring the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the agreement curbing nuclear weapons development that former President Trump had withdrawn the U.S. from in 2018 (see above). Due to Iran’s strong alliance with the Russian Federation, talks were suspended following the full invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022. Iran has since strengthened its alliance further and sent large numbers of drones and missiles used against mostly civilian Ukrainian targets in violation of sanctions adopted by the U.S. and European Union. At this stage, Iran resumed nuclear weapons-grade uranium enrichment and today is much closer to gaining the capacity to develop nuclear weapons than when under the restrictions imposed by the JCPOA.

Iranians continued to organize opposition to the regime and its policies. In late 2019 and early 2020, protests took place nationwide over increasing inequality and economic deprivation sparked initially by an increase in fuel prices. Protesters destroyed state banks and tore down billboards of Ayatollah Khamenei as well as anti-American posters. The regime’s security forces and the International Revolutionary Guards Council (IRGC) acted again with force. A report by Amnesty International listed a total of 304 persons killed, but news reports put the number far higher. Another set of nearly 250 protests took place in July and were again put down by force by the IRGC.

In the fall of 2022, a more prolonged nationwide protest movement erupted in response to the killing of a young woman, Mahsa Amini, for “improper wearing” of the hajib, or head covering. The protests, under the banner “Woman, Life, Freedom,” have been ongoing despite widespread killings, including of several more young women, public executions, and large-scale imprisonment by Iran’s security forces.

In the fall of 2022, a more prolonged nationwide protest movement erupted in response to the killing of a young woman, Mahsa Amini, for “improper wearing” of the hijab, or head covering. The protests, under the banner “Woman, Life, Freedom,” have been ongoing despite widespread killings, including of several more young women, public executions, and large-scale imprisonment by Iran’s security forces.

The “Woman, Life, Freedom” actions were the largest and most sustained protest movement in Iran since the Green Revolution of 2009 (see above). But demonstrators have faced fierce repression: security forces had killed a total of 573 people and also sentenced fifteen “Woman, Life, Freedom” protesters to death as of the one year anniversary of Amini’s killing. There were also reports of repeated poisonings of female students at schools, with numerous deaths. While demonstrations subsided after a year, there remained ongoing manifestations of the movement and continued defiance by women despite a new law increasing penalties for not wearing the hijab in public and a renewed directive to Morality Police to enforce it.

In recognition of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the 2023 Nobel Peace Prize to Narges Mohammadi “for her fight against the oppression of women in Iran and her fight to promote human rights and freedom for all.” Since 2011, Ms. Mohammadi, the vice president of the Defenders of Human Rights Center, has been arrested thirteen times, convicted five times and sentenced to a total of 31 years’ imprisonment and 131 lashes for her work against injustice. She is currently in prison, where she has written reports on sexual and physical abuse of detained women and organized solidarity actions with the Woman, Life, Freedom movement among fellow prisoners.

Thousands of political prisoners, including those imprisoned for infractions of Iran’s religious codes, were in jails or confined to house arrest even prior to the recent crackdown. Harsh sentences, including long terms of imprisonment and floggings, have been meted out by the Revolutionary Tribunals against poets, filmmakers, students, trade unionists, and others. Next to China, Iran continues to have the second highest number of executions in the world — and the highest rate per capita. In 2023, 834 people were executed, more than tripling the number in 2021. Many were involved in the Woman, Life, Freedom protest movement.

In March 2024, elections were held for the Islamic Consultative Assembly or Majlis, the nominal parliament. Again, these were not in any way competitive elections, much less free or fair. Independent candidates and most candidates running under the “Reform” alliance were prevented from even running for election by the Guardian Council. As in 2021, Iranians largely boycotted the elections (there was just 40 percent turnout). The hardline supporters of the regime, known as “principlists,” again gained near-total control of the Majlis.

In June 2024, President Ebrahim Raisi died in a plane crash. A special election, which is required under the constitution, was held in July to fill the term. Most Iranian voters abstained from participating in the first round (turnout was less than 40 percent) but in the second round more voters decided to participate (49 percent) to ensure the victory of a publicly less hardline candidate. A “Reformist” candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian, had pledged more moderate policies and a less confrontational foreign policy with the West (including to restart nuclear negotiations). He won the run-off with 55 percent of the vote against Saeed Jalili, the candidate of the “principlists.” Pezeshkian, however, was still an approved candidate of Ayatollah Khamenei and he is unlikely to substantively change Iran’s domestic or foreign policies. An indication came soon after Pezeshkian’s inauguration. His “vice president for strategy,” the former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif who had negotiated the JCPOA (see above) and strongly campaigned for Pezeshkian as a reformer, resigned when the new president went against his recommendations and appointed a cabinet comprised mostly of conservatives and hardliners.

Another sign was his reaction to the assassination of the political leader of the terrorist organization Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, who was attending Pezeshkian’s inauguration in late July. He was killed shortly afterward in a bomb explosion, widely attributed as an assassination by Israel in retribution for Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack on Israeli civilians (see Country Study). Iran’s new president joined Ayatollah Khamenei in promising to carry out harsh retribution.

Iran’s civic and pro-democracy movement continues to be active in both open and clandestine ways, aided often by Iranian exiles committed to bringing change to their country.

Overall, the Freedom House Survey of Freedom in the World has ranked Iran “not free” since its inception in 1973. In the last three years, there have been even further reduced scores due to violent repression, increased levels of imprisonment of civic activists and human rights lawyers, and diminished choice in elections. Its current ranking places Iran among the most repressive regimes in the world.

Nevertheless, Iran’s civic and pro-democracy movement continues to be active in both open and clandestine ways, aided often by Iranian exiles committed to bringing change to their country. (For example, Democracy Web has been translated into Persian by the group Tavaana and is being used in its online courses involving hundreds of students inside Iran.) While democracy advocates are unable to organize opposition freely, the 2009 protest movement and now the more recent “Woman, Life, Freedom” protest movement demonstrate that a very large part of Iranian society supports liberalization and seeks an end to the current theocracy. The more recent movement has not proved successful in obtaining larger freedom, however it has succeeded in asserting women’s right not to wear the hijab and women’s rights more broadly.